The Copenhagen Consensus Center does research on the costs and benefits of various policy approaches to global problems and provides information on which policy targets will do the most social good relative to their costs – acknowledging that factors other than cost/benefit ratios are also important. This is from their cost/benefit analysis on different approaches to biodiversity:

Translation: the figures on the right represent the economic benefit value for every dollar in cost. Looks pretty good to me: most policies considered give a lot of bang for their buck. The lone exception is “increase protected areas”, but the net cost is not that much. Seems like a bargain to me.

Many businesses subsidize some products through the profits they make on other products – why should policy approaches be different? You have to look at the whole mix of policies, not just the costs and benefits of each policy considered separately.

How can we increase reforestation on this poor benighted planet?  A good start is to see what lessons we can draw from places where reforestation has already happened naturally rather than as an intended result of deforestation policy. We’ll look at New England and Vietnam.

In New England, deforestation followed the shift from farming to manufacturing in the 19^th century. Land that had been farmed reverted to forests and people moved to locations where goods were produced and transported, especially along rivers, canals and rail lines. A lot of the countryside was simply abandoned in the process.

In Vietnam, policy changes leading to the strengthening of property rights and the development of markets for agricultural products contributed to the intensification of agriculture on the most suitable land and a decline in less productive areas, which subsequently reverted to woodland.  In the 1990s, new land-tenure laws designed to improve agricultural productivity allowed households to own forested lands and sell forest products from their land. This change in policy encouraged private stewardship and expansion of forested areas. Strengthened property rights meant smallholders could let land remain as forest without the risk of having it “colonized” by others.  Thus policies to reduce food scarcity in a country with limited land and an exploding population led to significant reforestation.

Two lessons here: 1) less land for agriculture, more land for forests; and 2) stronger property rights, more incentive to maintain and expand forests.

References:

Meyfroidt, P. & Lambin, E.F. 2008, “The Causes of the Reforestation in Vietnam”, Land Use Policy, vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 182-197.

Pfaff, Alexander (2007) From Deforestation to Reforestation in New England, United States. In World Forests from Deforestation to Transition? Volume 2 of the series World Forests pp 67-82

How do people become climate change skeptics?  Was it through manipulation by the Forces of Evil and/or Stupidity (e.g., Corporations, Republicans, Religion)? Did exposure to skeptical messages by these Forces lead them down the path of Doubt and Ignorance?  Or was it simple group identification – my friends are skeptics, ergo…?

As it turns out, a lot of skeptics say they used to be more concerned about climate change but exposure to the climate change activists and their dire messages convinced them that the threat of climate change was overstated. For instance,  in one study, several skeptics indicated the film “An Inconvenient Truth, “instigated or enhanced their skepticism”. Other skeptics were “inspired” by reading reports put out the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which they saw as long on questionable computer models and short on actual evidence.

A common theme among skeptics is an initial aversion to climate change activists, followed by exploration of evidence and views at odds with the “consensus”, followed by increased skepticism. In other words, first they were turned off by the message of activists. Then they were turned on by the arguments of skeptics.

So why are climate change activists so repugnant to some people?  I’m thinking it’s mostly their perceived: 1) moral self-righteousness that imputes the character of those who disagree; 2) tone of certainty that exceeds the science; and, 3) exclusive focus on worst-case scenarios. Take “An Inconvenient truth” for instance. Its title alone invites resistance from anyone on the fence. The film basically trivializes skepticism as a matter of not wanting to be inconvenienced. Talk about character assassination! Anyone who disagrees with Al Gore is willing to destroy the planet to avoid walking to the grocery store or just putting on a sweater when the house is cold.  Impugning the character of non-believers is rarely a winning strategy for gaining converts.

Dire messaging about climate change, especially when delivered with a tone of certainty that exceeds the science, can backfire. Subjecting skeptics to vividly catastrophic climate scenarios won’t work – and might even increase their skepticism.  When there’s already a degree of mistrust, arguing on the basis of authority (the “consensus”) or relying on fear tactics increases distrust.

But that doesn’t mean that most skeptics are irrational or unconcerned. I predict if the evidence of global climate change gets stronger, many skeptics will change their tune. That doesn’t mean they’ll believe that catastrophe awaits unless drastic measures are taken – it just means more will accept there’s a problem.

Then, hopefully, we can move on and have vigorous arguments about what to do when, without character assassination or name calling.

So I’ve been wrapping my head around possible ways to achieve the goal of keeping average global temperatures within 2°C of the 2000 level for remainder of 21st century. A huge expansion of carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology would help – but how feasible is it?

Currently, not very.

Problem 1 is economic. CCS is expensive and there isn’t the political will or commercial zeal to take on its costs. Here’s what a recent CCS progress report says:

“Without predictable government support, emission limits or a strong carbon price, private investors and utilities are reluctant to build new CCS-equipped plants or retrofit the existing ones. At the same time, governments cannot entirely finance projects whose financial viability, especially in the power sector (where the majority of GHGs are produced), is unclear. But without new investment, deployment and testing, it is unlikely to achieve the progress needed to reduce costs and increase efficiency. Bringing CCS in line with a 2°C scenario would require a total undiscounted investment of USD 3.6 trillion until 2050. Current cumulative investment in large-scale CCS has amounted to USD 12 billion since 2005.” (D’Aprile, 2016)

Problem 2 is time: the process of identifying, exploring and finally building CCS storage sites can take decades. Committing to this process is a risky proposition, given that much remains unknown about where and how to store carbon. The best way to find out is to learn by doing. But that’s time consuming and expensive, with uncertain payoff – and so far, few governments or investors have been willing to jump in. A classic Catch-22 situation.

Problem 3 is political: you can bet that opposition to CCS will be massive. CCS involves transportation of CO2 (likely compressed and through pipelines), which would then be injected into deep underground rock formations. It doesn’t matter that these formations would be a mile or more beneath the surface in porous rock that holds the CO_2, overlaid with impermeable, non-porous layers of rock that trap the CO₂ and prevent it from migrating upward.  The same groups freaked out about fracking and the Keystone pipeline will go apoplectic in practice even in sanguine in principle.

So where does that leave us? I say keep trying with the carbon capture and storage – you never know: there may be a breakthrough. But we can’t count on CCS to save the planet.

Not to worry!

References:

 D’Aprile, A. Advances and slowdowns in Carbon Capture and Storage technology development . ICCG Reflection No. 48/May 2016

Liang  et al Recent progress and new developments in post-combustion carbon-capture technology with amine based solvents  International Journal of Greenhouse Gas Control Volume 40, September 2015, Pages 26–54

What is carbon dioxide capture and sequestration? https://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/ccs/

Summary so far: to keep average global temperatures within 2°C by 2100, we’ll need to be a lot more energy efficient, reproduce less (not exceeding 9 billion by century’s end), and get really good at increasing agricultural productivity so that lots of land can revert back to the wilds.

Scenarios associated with RCP2.6 show how this might be possible. In a typical RCP2.6 scenario,  carbon capture technology would greatly reduce the GHGs produced by coal and natural gas. Bio-energy and renewables would also play a part – but not more than is already expected per current trends. And later in the century, nuclear energy would make a comeback.

Check out the following chart. On the right is an energy mix consistent with staying within 2°C by 2100. On the left is a scenario that assumes carbon capture and storage basically won’t happen.

It’s obviously  essential  to make carbon capture and storage happen. On a huge scale.

Staying within 2°C by 2100 would also require that we do everything we can to reduce population growth. Which means to educate the women of the world, insure sufficient economic development to absorb their precious skills, and promote a global culture of female empowerment so that no woman has sex or bears children unless she wants to. Sorry mister: you ain’t having none except on my terms.

Anti-GMO activists would also need to be marginalized or see the error of their ways. More GM Agriculture = less land for agriculture = more reforestation and wild habitat.

Between major advances in carbon capture and storage, expansion of nuclear energy,  female empowerment, and intensive, sustainable agriculture, staying within a 2°C rise by 2100 is within the realm. It is feasible.

Now, if only…

Reference:

van Vuuren, Detlef P.  et al (2011) RCP2.6: exploring the possibility to keep global mean temperature increase below 2°C. Climatic Change; 109:95–116 DOI 10.1007/s10584-011-0152-3

In my last post, I suggested that we (humans) set the goal of staying, roughly, within the RCP2.6 scenario, which would keep global temperatures within 2°C by 2100.  RCP2.6 is one of the four Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) presented by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) a few years ago. A scenario consistent with RCP2 is a global population of 9 billion in 2100, fairly robust global GDP growth, middling reforestation and wild habitat restoration,  relatively less oil (and more natural gas) consumption than the other RCPs, and decent advances in carbon capture technologies van Vuuren et al (2011a). This scenario, per its authors, “represents a medium development scenario for population, income, energy use and land use” ((van Vuuren et al; 2011b, p. 100)

In the”a picture is worth a 100 words” department, here,are several graphs illustrating the above (all from van Vuuren et al (2011b):

Note that if the graph lines fall within gray areas, they are considered within reasonable as per various experts as per IPCC. All the RCPs are within the gray areas. Otherwise, the IPCC wouldn’t be wasting our time with fantasies.

So, is RCP2.6 scenario presented above really reasonable? Mull it over, explore it in your problem space, and stay tuned…..

References:

van Vuuren, Detlef P.  et al  (2011) RCP2.6: exploring the possibility to keep global mean temperature increase below 2°C. Climatic Change; 109:95–116 DOI 10.1007/s10584-011-0152-3

van Vuuren, D et al. The representative concentration pathways: an overview. Climatic Change (2011) 109: 5. doi:10.1007/s10584-011-0148-z

What to do about climate change? Initiate the Process. The first few steps being: define the Problem, then specify what you want to accomplish (the goal) and what you want to avoid.

The Problem is the projected ongoing rise in global temperatures (due to increased concentrations of GHGs).  The goal is to keep the rise within this century to no more than 2°C. What we want to avoid is any net increase in human mortality and poverty, as well as any significant decline of non-human species. In other words, limit the extent of climate change and do so in a way that protects the entire biosphere.

Note that protecting the biosphere doesn’t necessarily mean keeping existing wild habitats in their “natural” state.  A 2°C rise in global temperature will still be very disruptive. Human intervention and specie relocation will be part of the story.

Limiting global temperature to +2°C by 2100 would be roughly compatible with two of the four Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) provided by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), as in the following chart:

The goal, then, is to stay within RCP2.6, or at worst, the low end of RCP4.5. Part of figuring out if this is even feasible requires us to look at the assumptions that were required to arrive at RCP2.6 and RCP4.5. Are these assumptions realistic, based on current trends?

Next: looking more closely at RCP2.6 and RCP4.5

The basic message of the last few posts: climate change projections require assumptions about human behavior and these assumptions may be questionable. For instance, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has presented a “business-as-usual” trajectory of green house gas concentrations that would result in a mean global temperature rise of 3.7°C (2.6 to 4.8°C range) by 2100, meaning that such concentrations are plausible if present trends continue.  Problem is, the “trends” assumed by this trajectory are the exact opposite of what’s actually occurring. Please see previous posts for details.

One could argue that it really doesn’t matter whether climate change projections are reasonable based on the current evidence – what matters is that people and governments are mobilized to take serious action now, the idea being that the specter of sure disaster mobilizes better than the specter of possible harm. This works well enough when most everyone agrees the awfulness will happen soon unless averted by decisive action.

But what if the really, really bad stuff isn’t supposed to happen for decades and there is no consensus about how bad it will be. (The IPCC actually offers a range of possible climate change scenarios, from the manageable and not too scary to the calamitous and super-scary. Guess which one gets the most press?) What if the messenger isn’t considered trustworthy, having raised false alarms in the past?  Will the little boy who cries ‘Wolf!’ get a serious hearing the louder he screams, even though he’s been screaming loudly for a very long time and no wolf is in sight?

Assumptions about the magnitude, rate, and effects of climate change make all the difference in the world if you’re trying to formulate  policies to mitigate and adapt to climate change. All policies involve trade-offs and all have potential downsides. Whatever we do about climate change is bound to help in some ways and hurt in others, whether we take an incremental or aggressive approach.  Sometimes baby steps work best; sometimes great leaps forward. The devil, as always, is in the details.

Next: what details?